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The 20th Century was defined in stark terms by great power conflict between the reigning
powers of the day. From WWI and WWII to the Cold War in the latter half of the century, intense
security competition shaped the world for most of the duration of the century. Unfortunately, the
modern world does not seem to be inherently immune to such competition. In fact, the 21st
Century, much like the one preceding it, is likely to be defined in large part by conflict. In this
century, it will be between the current dominant global power, the US, and the rapidly growing
Chinese state. The competition is likely to be intense, and it will involve much of the globe
(Mearsheimer, 2014).
What are some of the possible ramifications of the rise of China and the security conflict
between the Chinese state and the US? How can the US work to contest China and prevent some
of the more concerning ramifications of its rise while also preventing the worst outcomes of the
security conflict? In this paper I aim to establish that the rise of China, if left unchecked, could
lead to a destabilization of East Asia and the American-led system of alliances that has kept a
relative balance there. Furthermore, if handled improperly, the security competition between the
US and China could lead to outright war. However, there are ways the US can mitigate the risk
of open conflict while ensuring that China does not dominate East Asia uncontested.
China is an economic, military, and political powerhouse. Its Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) has seen growth over 5% yearly on average for the past few decades, and it has over one
billion people living within its borders (World Bank, 2019). It has also been growing its military
strength, now fielding the largest army in the world and working to modernize its military forces
(DoD, 2020). Despite this, there is no consensus in the international relations community on
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whether China will attempt to become a hegemonic power, whether it will succeed, or if it does
attempt to do so, in what manner it will go about it (Danner & Martin, 2019; Beckley, 2018).
Chinese state leaders have attempted to show the world that the economic rise of China
will be peaceful, and that their intentions are not to radically upset the balance of power, that
China is a status quo power (Danner & Martin, 2019). However, some of the more recent actions
of the Chinese government have worked against this notion. China has been increasing its
funding for their military in recent years, and as of 2020 had the largest navy in the world (DoD,
2020). Additionally, in 2017 the Chinese navy was considered 70% modern, a rapid rise from
previous estimates (Heginbotham, 2015). Finally, China has been rapidly developing more
advanced area-denial weapons systems including surface-to-air missiles and land-based cruise
missile sites (Jamison, 2020). These weapon systems could serve to make US intervention in the
region significantly more challenging.
China has also been acting assertively, perhaps even aggressively, in the economic
sphere. By expanding its infrastructure plans and creating a reliance on Chinese goods in foreign
countries, China is able to gain leverage over some of those nations’ governments, creating
indebtedness and allowing China to expand its influence abroad at other states’ expense as will
be examined in detail below (Wong, 2021). China has also been more assertive with regards to
the sea regions surrounding itself, bringing it into some amount of conflict with Japan over
islands such as the Senkaku island chain (Kim et al., 2016). Given these recent trends and
actions, it is my contention that China is unlikely to truly be a status quo power, despite the
statements of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials.
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It is conceivable, or perhaps even likely, that an intensification of security conflict could
lead to outright war. Given the more assertive stance of China toward Taiwan discussed
previously, as well as US commitments to Taiwanese independence reiterated in 2021, that could
serve as a flashpoint for armed conflict. Additionally, based on a realist framework and
Thucydides’ Trap discussed below, it seems likely that China, as an up-and-coming great power,
runs a high risk of being brought into conflict with the dominant great power, the US (Allison,
2018). While many scholars of international relations believe that an armed conflict can stay
limited in scope and stay within the realm of traditional warfare, that is not a universally
accepted view, and the potential damage from a nuclear conflict means that avoidance of armed
conflict with another nuclear power is the best option for global security (Gibson, 2019).
Furthermore, should China obtain regional hegemony, it would be more empowered to
upend the existing systems of international monetary and economic policy such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), radically
changing international norms and regulations to be more friendly to Chinese interests (Hang,
2017). China would also be able to intensify its ability to leverage economic ties with developing
nations, as well as the reliance of multinational companies on Chinese markets, into political
power and infrastructure assets. This would give it more authority over both the governments of
other nations and the decisions of businesses within them (Wong, 2021). Given this, the US and
its allies should not simply accept a new status quo in which China supersedes the US on the
global stage; it is my contention that the US must attempt to prevent China from attaining
regional hegemony and must remain competitive with the Chinese economy and military
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throughout the century, both for the security interests of the US and its allies as well as interests
of global economic prosperity and security.
To that end, this paper will provide recommendations and strategies for how to overcome,
or at least stay competitive with, China in the coming years without resorting to open warfare. It
will begin with an outlining of neoclassical realism, the theoretical framework to be used
throughout the rest of the paper. This section will also cover alternative theoretical frameworks
and some of their strengths and weaknesses as I see them, as well as why I have chosen the
particular framework that I have.
After discussing the theoretical framework being used, this paper will discuss the rise of
China itself, and the ramifications of its rising power. This section will especially focus on the
potential ramifications of Chinese attempts at hegemonic status in East Asia. It will also focus on
the importance of Taiwan to regional security, as well as a discussion of how China is using its
robust economy and infrastructure development initiatives to gain increased dominance in East
Asia and abroad. Following this section will be a discussion on the current status of US alliances
in Asia and how those nations, predominantly Japan and to a lesser extent South Korea, factor
into the balance of power in the region.
Finally, the last section of this paper will be a discussion on what the US specifically can
do to help curtail the displacement caused by the rise of China. This section will detail how the
US can work with regional allies to ensure the de-facto independence of Taiwan. It will also
discuss how the US can lead an effort to use existing international financial institutions and
private sector investment to reduce the reliance on China and its loans that is spreading in
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developing nations, as well as how to reduce the ability of China to use existing debt among
those nations to increase its standing.
Neoclassical Realism: The Theoretical Framework
There are many lenses through which one could analyze the international system that the
US and China exist within. Each of these interpretations would have radically different effects on
the understanding of the current situation and the recommendations for policymakers. Therefore,
it would be prudent to go over several of them before delineating why I have chosen the theory I
have for this paper.
One of the major theories within the international relations discipline is that of liberalism.
Liberalism, in its various forms, maintains that the international system consists of international
organizations through which norms and collaboration between states can be fostered. This can
take the form of economic interconnectedness such as with the IMF and the WTO, or it can take
the form of international laws and agreed upon standards such as those enshrined in the UN or
the Geneva Conventions (Moravcsik, 1992). This theory maintains that through the use of such
institutions we can drastically decrease the likelihood of conflict in the international setting.
However, as we will see, China’s participation within such international organizations does not
appear to have lessened the desire of the Chinese state for power, and in fact may have given
them some of the tools that they are using to acquire power and influence on the world stage,
often at the expense of other states (Wong, 2021; Lee 2018).
The next theory we will discuss is that of realism. Realism is a theory that, at its core,
emphasizes the idea that conflict between nations, rather than being a result of differing
6

ideologies or the personalities of their leaders, results from tensions within the structure of the
international system. First and foremost, realists believe that states, which are the highest real
form of human organization at present, always exist in a state of anarchy (Waltz, 1979). Because
of this, they must look to their own safety and security due to the lack of a higher authority for
arbitration, and so this becomes their highest priority (Mearsheimer, 2014).
There are a few specific variations of the realist theory. Offensive realism posits that
states seek to maximize their share of power in the system they are in by aggressively expanding,
seeking at all times to outdo their competitors and establish hegemony over their region. A key
principle of offensive realism is that a state is only a credible contender for regional hegemony if
it is able to fight and defeat all of its great power rivals at once (Mearsheimer, 2014).
Offensive realists also believe that economic strength is the foundation for hard power,
especially the military power that so often determines the outcomes of security conflicts
(Mearsheimer, 2014). Thus, economic power provides a sort of latent power that allows a state to
maintain a competitive edge in security conflicts. While there are numerous factors that may
influence the outcome of conflicts, realist theory contends that the economic strength of a state is
critical to its ability to manage conflicts in a way that is beneficial to its interests.
This stands in contrast to defensive realism, which posits that in order to best provide for
their own security states must ardently defend their borders without antagonizing or otherwise
provoking their neighbors. This theory states that wars of aggression or other attempts to
establish regional hegemony are either foolish endeavors launched by leaders failing to heed the
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necessities of the international system or sporadic, rather than endemic, necessities (Lobell,
2017). However, one very large example strongly defies this theory: the US itself.
The United States is the first nation in modern history which has established credible
hegemonic status over their region. Furthermore, the US has done so in large part via wars of
aggression (Mearsheimer, 2014). These wars include the Spanish-American War, which gained
the US large territories in the Caribbean and some in the Pacific, as well as the MexicanAmerican War at the conclusion of which Mexico ceded all of its territory north of the Rio
Grande included New Mexico and California (Brittanica, 2021; Brittanica 2021). This
hegemonic control has been exemplified by the Monroe Doctrine, which warned European
powers against interfering in the Western Hemisphere and through which the US claimed more
political authority to intervene in the affairs of its neighbors, solidifying its power (Gibson,
2019). This was then solidified by the Roosevelt Corollary, which lent further credence to the
American policy of using force to ensure political stability of nations in the Western Hemisphere,
as well as intervening in their domestic politics to support US interests (Ricard, 2006). This
aggressive expansion and establishment of regional control is firmly in line with the expectations
of the realist theory (Mearsheimer, 2014).
There is another major theory of realism that is especially useful for the purposes of this
paper, that of neoclassical realism. This theory shares many, if not most, of the underlying
assumptions of other realist schools of thought. It is still predominantly structural in nature,
emphasizing that the anarchic nature of the international system compels states to protect their
security interests first and foremost and to seek power where it can be found. It also agrees that
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in the face of a revisionist challenger state such as interwar Germany or, I argue, modern day
China, balancing or buck-passing are still the most useful options for managing the disruption to
the status quo (Ripsman, 2011).
The main piece that neoclassical realists bring to the table as opposed to structural
realism is that neoclassical realists allow for the idea that while there are certain ways states
ought to respond to threats in the international arena, domestic considerations may prevent them
from doing so. It recognizes that states are institutions that are led by humans, and therefore the
responses to outside stimuli may not be proper. This can be because the leadership of a state does
not properly recognize the situation it is in. It could also be because leaders do not recognize all
of their options or choose improperly among several of them. Finally, a state could pursue an
improper strategy to outside stimuli because of domestic economic or political constraints that
prevent the apparatus of state from gaining enough resources from their civil society to compete
properly (Ripsman, 2011).
It may seem strange to use a framework that, compared to other theories under the realist
umbrella, emphasizes domestic politics and the importance of domestic politics in a paper that
barely touches on that. However, neoclassical realism looks much the same as other realist
variations when examined through a purely international relations lens. Because of this, using it
is helpful if I decide to further expand on this paper later, while also maintaining the same utility
that a different, more classical realist framework would provide to the paper as it stands now.
Fitting within the overarching theory of realism is an idea that sheds some light on the
specifics of the US-China conflict. It is called Thucydides’ Trap, named after a Greek scholar
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during the Peloponnesian War. This theory states that when an existing dominant force in a
system is confronted by a rising state that threatens to displace it, the system suffers structural
strain to the point that armed conflict is the most likely outcome (Lee, 2019). Some modern
scholars of international relations have asserted that the Sino-US conflict is another example of
this phenomenon, contending that the current place of both China, the rising state, and the US,
the dominant state, makes armed conflict likely (Allison, 2018).
Thucydides’ Trap is what this paper seeks to help the US and its allies avoid, while at the
same time attempt to preserve the overall structure of the current geopolitical system. This paper
also seeks to help the US remain competitive with its current competitor, and to limit the changes
to the system that the rise of China is likely to create. Under a realist interpretation, the rise of
China is going to change the balance of power; by acting wisely, the US can increase the
likelihood that the world retains safety, stability, and prosperity without ceding US primacy.

Ramifications of Chinese Hegemony
First, we must define what exactly it means for a state to be a hegemon. A hegemonic
power is a state that, in addition to wielding a disproportionately large amount of wealth and
power compared to its contemporaries in the system, is also able to shape that system to suit its
own ends (Gilpin, 1988). This is exemplified in the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary
mentioned earlier: they were ways in which the US could shape the international forces in their
region in a way that profoundly benefitted itself.
10

Additionally, according to realist theory, a hegemon must be able to credibly exert
military dominance over every other great power in the system. Thus, true global hegemony has
so far not been achieved by any state, and the advent of nuclear weapons has made achieving this
goal considerably more difficult, if not impossible (Mearsheimer, 2014). While the US may
meet some standards for hegemony, namely having a vast amount of wealth and power as well as
shaping international norms and systems, it cannot credibly defeat every other great power’s
military, and therefore despite its global influence it is a regional hegemon. Because of the great
difficulty in achieving global hegemony, this paper will focus solely on potential regional
hegemony for China.
Before diving any deeper should be clear about a critical point: China does not yet have
hegemonic control over East Asia. As we will see later, Japan has been shifting towards a firmer
stand in opposition of China in recent years, including a government initiative designed to shift
production from China back to Japan (Nakazawa, 2020). Given the Japanese status as the third
largest world economy, China is far from the only great power in the region (World Bank, 2019).
Additionally, Japan had a GDP per capita roughly four times that of China in 2019 according to
the World Bank. Some research shows that GDP per capita provides a more reliable measure of
economic and military strength than GDP alone (Beckley, 2018). Even South Korea, with its
comparatively small economy and overall population, possesses a large and well-equipped
military (Nye & Kim, 2013). More critically for our definition of hegemony, China does not
appear to be capable yet of radically altering the nature of the international system in East Asia,
as shown by the continuing alliances of Japan and South Korea with the US as well as the failure

11

thus far of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to generate significant economic power for the
Chinese state (Wong, 2021).
With that said, the Chinese economy is the largest in East Asia, and the second largest in
the world (World Bank, 2019). This lends credence to the potential for China to grow in power
over the next few decades if their economic growth continues. Additionally, while BRI may have
produced limited financial gains for China thus far as indicated previously, there is evidence that
it has increased China’s ability to influence other nations through debt, showing that they may be
on the way toward reshaping at least some elements of the international system (Gerstel, 2018).
The BRI will be covered in significant detail below.
China is also using other elements of the international economy to its own ends. Chinese
companies, supported by the Chinese state, are buying or otherwise gaining favorable access to
ports in both Europe and Asia (Lee, 2018). In Asia, especially in developing nations, this can buy
the Chinese state both greater economic clout as well as political primacy, enabling the Chinese
state to better shape the politics of the region in a way that favors the strategic interests of the
Chinese government. While this strategy is more difficult in Europe, it is still possible, especially
given the particularities of the EU.
Since actions by the EU require unanimity among participants, the swaying of even a
single nation toward Chinese strategic goals is a large victory for China. Greece, for instance, has
been more open than other European nations toward allowing Chinese economic influence,
allowing more investments in the region and allowing a Chinese company to purchase a Greek
shipping company (Lee, 2018). It seems that this may be starting to pay off for China, as in 2017
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Greece prevented the EU from issuing a statement regarding Chinese human rights abuses. Using
this strategy, China only needs a relatively small amount of influence in Europe in order to
prevent the EU from taking any meaningful action to curtail Chinese power or otherwise act
counter to Chinese interests.
When all is said and done, a world in which China has attained credible hegemony over
East Asia is an inherently less stable world. Furthermore, it could severely diminish or destroy
the security guarantees that have in large part built the modern world. Without those guarantees,
while it is certainly possible that the EU would maintain as an independent force, the war-torn
history of Europe shows that such a rosy outcome is not likely. The best way to maintain peace
and prosperity globally is for the US to contain China and ensure that it does not attain such
vaunted status.
Taiwanese De Facto Independence & Strategic Importance
Taiwan is an island just off the southern coast of mainland China which has historically
been Chinese territory, though it has been controlled by the Japanese at points as well, most
notably during WWII. In the 1940’s, Mao Zedong led a revolution against the reigning
government at the time, led by Chiang Kai-shek. When Chiang Kai-shek was pushed off the
mainland, he and his government fled to the island of Taiwan. Since then, both governments
have agreed that Taiwan is a part of China, but the government in Taiwan maintained that it was
the legitimate Chinese government whereas the government in Beijing, along with the vast
majority of the international community, has held that the government on the mainland is the
legitimate Chinese state (Brittanica, 2021).
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In the 1970’s, Taiwan lost its UN representation, and has since lost much of its
international diplomatic ties with other nations as a result of China’s growing strength and the
importance of maintaining good relations with the Chinese state (Brittanica, 2021). However, the
US has stated that any attempt to change the status quo regarding Taiwan would be “of grave
concern” to the US. In the 1990’s, the US sent a carrier group through the Strait of Taiwan after
China fired missiles off the Taiwanese coast as a response to their elections (Blackwill &
Zelikow, 2021).
Recently, China has been putting more pressure on Taiwan, as well as ratcheting up their
rhetoric on the possibility of outright aggression in order to secure control over the island, citing
the supposed failure of the president, re-elected in 2016, to adhere to the One China policy
(Blackwill & Zelikow, 2021). This increased bellicosity increases the importance of the ongoing
US discussion, among scholars of international relations even if not always among elected
officials, over whether the US should support Taiwanese de-facto independence (Rehman, 2014).
There are some who contend that withdrawing support for Taiwan may ease the tense
relationship between the US and China (Glaser, 2011). They argue that were the US to allow
China to take control of Taiwan uncontested, its territorial ambitions would be satisfied, and it
would become a status-quo power. However, it is my contention that this stance is ill-conceived.
The main reason I consider this to be a poor strategy to reduce Sino-US tension is that
there is no reason to believe Chinese territorial ambition would be sated. If, as I made the case
for earlier, China is indeed pushing for regional hegemony over East Asia then their territorial
ambition would very likely involve other parts of the region such as the Senkaku island chain,
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contested by Japan (Rehman, 2014; Kim et al. 2016). Indeed, if the rise of China is viewed
through the lens of Thucydides’ Trap, then the absorption of Taiwan into the main Chinese state
would do little to ameliorate the underlying structural tensions between the US, the superpower
state, and China, the rising state (Allison, 2018).
The protection of Taiwan is also of critical strategic importance to the US and its allies.
This is because Chinese territorial ambition is to a significant degree contained by the group of
islands immediately surrounding it, referred to as the first island chain, which Taiwan is a part of
along with the Philippines and a few other island chains (Espena & Bomping, 2020). Were China
to attain control of Taiwan, it would be in a significantly better position to dictate the flow of any
potential conflict in the Pacific, gaining much greater ability to project both air and naval power
over many of the other islands in the region, or even regions in the Southwest of Japan that are
critical to Japanese communication and transport (Rehman, 2014).
Currently, Taiwan serves as a sort of plug, a natural barrier to help contain Chinese force
projection in the Pacific. Given that a walking-back of American support for Taiwan would be
unlikely to reduce tensions between China and the US, it is in the best interests of the US and its
allies to retain the status quo of Taiwan as a functionally, though not technically, independent
island. The strategy for how to ensure the status quo will be discussed at length later in this
paper.
Belt and Road Initiative and Chinese Economic Power
The Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI, is a massive infrastructure project designed to
create economic inroads in developing nations in East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Central Europe.
15

It began in 2013 under the tenure of Xi Jinping, China’s current head of state, though the BRI
designation is somewhat loose and has been given to projects begun before that date as well. The
scope of the initiative is massive, with some estimates placing the total cost over the lifetime of
the initiative at $1.2 to 1.3 trillion (Chatzky & McBride, 2018). Despite the opportunities that
such investment could present to developing nations, however, there is a great deal of concern in
the international community that the details of the BRI are both opaque and unfavorable to the
nations receiving investment (Chatzky & McBride, 2018).
The plan, which has both an overland component and a maritime component, is based
around creating large amounts of infrastructure in recipient nations, especially transport
infrastructure such as roads, pipelines, and ports in order to better facilitate trade. This could
have multiple beneficial effects for China. First, it would create large dividends for Chinese
companies and the Chinese state, given that China is an extremely export-focused economy
(Chatzky & McBride, 2018).
The BRI is also designed to more generally improve the standing of the Chinese state
abroad. Xi Jinping has been attempting to use the BRI and other Chinese economic strategies in
order to push the Chinese system of economic planning to other nations in the region, attempting
to supplant, or at least compete with, the existing international monetary and economic
structures. Additionally, according to Elizabeth Economy in a 2018 Foreign Affairs article, the
Chinese state has been granting preferential treatment to companies that are owned and operated
by the CCP. This not only subverts domestic corporations without government aid but also
foreign ones when these state-supported companies compete with private companies abroad.
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The support of certain companies by the Chinese government speaks to a wider concern
regarding the Chinese economic structure. The CCP has shown a willingness to bend the rules
and expectations of a modern economy in order to ensure the primacy of Chinese businesses. For
instance, after enacting its “Made in China 2025” program the CCP has begun requiring car
manufacturers to use only batteries that have been created in Chinese factories operating for at
least one year (Economy, 2018). This allows those companies to have a disproportionately large
market share in China, pushing out foreign companies that may be competitors without such
government assistance and interference.
These economic and political goals have converged recently in China’s attempts to use
economic leverage to silence dissent amongst both corporations that seek to do business in China
as well as foreign governments that have relied on Chinese money (Economy, 2018). The
Chinese government uses the massive market potential inherent to its large, economically
growing populace to threaten companies, initiating punitive taxes or restrictions on how
companies can operate in China (Braw, 2021). This can cause companies to attempt to pressure
their home governments into different action or rhetoric. This has occurred with multiple
companies in multiple nations, notably in Sweden after its government announced it would not
use Chinese companies Huawei and ZTE in its 5G network and in Australia after that
government advocated for an investigation into the origins of Covid. These coercive measures
function similarly to how sanctions have historically functioned when levied by the US and its
allies, though targeted to individual companies and for more blatantly illiberal, political reasons
(Braw, 2021).
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China is expanding its economic and political clout through debt-based foreign
investments in developing nations, buying up influence that can then be used to either strengthen
its economic power or cause governments to act more in ways that are amenable to Chinese
interests. In addition, it is using the power of its government to artificially alter the playing field
for multinational companies, while using its large population and critical importance to many
Western companies in order to influence their behavior and that of their home nations. This may
allow China to fundamentally alter the dynamic of the international economic order at least in its
own geopolitical backyard in East Asia. It is still possible, however, for the US and its allies to
counter these strategies, as will be shown below.
Solutions to the Sino-US Great Power Conflict
US Alliances in East Asia: Japanese Strategy
One of the main ways the US can contain the growing military might of China, and to
blunt its assertiveness, is to ensure that our existing alliance structures in the region are robust
and strong. As the third largest economy in the world, Japan is an extremely valuable ally for the
US. However, there are some problems that prevent it from being as reliable as it could be,
problems the US could go a long way towards fixing.
Before delving further into the specifics of Japan, it should be made clear that Japan is
not the only ally the US has in the region. South Korea in particular is a militarily strong ally
(Nye & Kim, 2013). However, many of the basic strategies that will help solidify the US-Japan
alliance will work with other nations as well, and so Japan is being used as an example. This is
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not meant to limit or discredit the importance of other regional allies, simply to save on time and
space for the purposes of this paper.
Since the end of WWII, Japan has had no true military relying instead on a purely
defensive force called the Japanese Self-Defense Force or JSDF. Because of this, it has relied on
a strategy called economic hedging, meaning it has economically balanced against the US by
ensuring that its economy is extremely robust even independent of US based resources or
investment, while militarily bandwagoning with it, relying almost entirely on the US military for
defense of its waters and force projection. Japan has had a more assertive approach to China, one
that rightly cannot be called hedging, but still seems to fall short of traditional balancing (Koga,
2018).
This is because Japan has certainly aided in balancing against China, mostly by providing
the US military with ample army, air, and naval bases in the region. However, while Japan has
not bandwagoned with China economically, neither has it really balanced against it. Rather,
Japan has had periods of economic cooperation, or outright investment, with China interspersed
with periods of rapidly declining relations accompanied by economic withdrawal (Mochizuki,
2007). This Japanese strategy vis a vis China appears to be shifting, however.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has recently signaled a shift away from Japanese
economic entanglements with China (Nakazawa, 2020). Japan is attempting to change its supply
chains such that it will no longer be overly reliant on China. According to Katsuji Nakazawa at
Nikkei Asia, it has put $2.2 billion towards a policy assisting Japanese companies in either
moving their production to Japan or trying to spread their production base to other parts of Asia.
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In addition, the Japanese appear to be becoming more willing to invest in the JSDF with
Prime Minister Abe steadily increasing Japans military spending as well as allowing it to
cooperate fully with foreign militaries to protect Japanese interests (Smith, 2021). This will go a
long way towards allowing Japan to help contain China without outright conflict. By providing
an overwhelming united front, Japan helps ensure that China cannot successfully fight all of its
great power rivals in East Asia plus the US, thus not fulfilling one of the key requirements for a
hegemonic contender. However, the Japanese military still relies heavily on the US which
presents its own challenge.
The biggest challenge the US faces with regards to its alliance with Japan is that Japan is
stuck in something of a paradox: if it relies on our military, it may win out with minimal cost to
itself should the US successfully come to its aid and honor our alliance. However, if America
does not, it will be thoroughly unable to put up a fight against China on its own. However,
should it build up its military, then it will at least somewhat hamper its economy, perhaps
unnecessarily should the US indeed support it militarily (Koga, 2018).
The best way the US can help manage this dilemma is by visibly rededicating itself to the
alliance with Japan and by taking steps to increase the cooperation between the US military and
the JSDF. This will not only enhance actual operational capability and cohesion, but it will also
show the Japanese state that America will honor its alliance. However, such rededication must be
contingent on continued building of the JSDF. The US must make it clear that it wants to help
Japan defend itself and the balance of power but that it will not and cannot do it alone.
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Japan has a huge amount of latent power, and its economic abilities could allow it to
build a robust, effective military. Moreover, the US can lend its vast experience and
organizational talent to the JSDF using joint exercises. This could make Japan a force to be
reckoned with in the region, decreasing the likelihood that China will be willing or able to push
for hegemony.
The United States, being first and foremost an offshore balancer, requires a strong
regional ally to contest and contain China in its quest for hegemony. Japan, with its strong
economic base, long ties to the US, and vested strategic interest in seeing China contained, is a
natural partner for America in the 21st Century. However, this alliance will require some amount
of care and management if it is to be effective. This means that the US must ensure that it is
visibly committed to Japanese security and has sufficient forces ready to respond to an incident.
It also requires that Japan increase its military spending and support the American effort to
contain China. Doing so would decrease the likelihood of both Chinese hegemony and open
warfare.
Protecting Taiwanese De-Facto Independence
As discussed previously, there are several ways China could attempt to eliminate the
question of Taiwanese autonomy and gain firm control over the island. As we will see below,
diplomatic attempts at finding unification have failed and do not seem likely to succeed in the
near future. With this in mind, China can attempt either coercive measures in order to try to
encourage Taiwan to accept unification, or it can mount an outright invasion of Taiwan in order
to force the issue with military might.
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Coercive efforts to encourage Taiwanese unification with mainland China have not been
working thus far. In 2016 Taiwan elected a left-leaning president to its highest office. Since then,
citing a failure of the Taiwanese president to commit to a One China policy, which is the policy
that Taiwan is a part of China, the government on the mainland has attempted to push Taiwan out
of many international systems and reduce its foreign trade and tacit alliances (Hernandez, 2016).
It has also begun forcing Taiwanese businesses to use rhetoric more in line with the official CCP
stance on Taiwan (Blackwill & Zelikow, 2021).
Despite this, the president of Taiwan has refused to accept the One Country, Two Systems
framework for unification, under which Taiwan would keep much of its economic structures, but
become a special administrative region similar to Hong Kong, with China in control of who can
lead Taiwan. Additionally, the people of Taiwan appear to be staunchly against unification under
mainland Chinese terms, with over 60% opposing it (Hickey, 2020). Since coercive measures
appear, at least so far, to be ineffective in forcing unification, this paper will focus primarily on
preventing China from using military power to cause Taiwan to accept unification under
mainland Chinese terms. This focus is made more prudent by the second goal of this paper,
which is to help avoid open conflict between the US and China.
There are several ways China could attempt to use military force to unify Taiwan with the
mainland. While the details of any US and allied plan would change with the situation, the
overall strategy should any use of military force to coerce Taiwan occur would likely be similar
(Blackwill & Zelikow, 2021). That strategy would likely look similar to what occurred in Berlin
during the Cold War.
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According to a special report from the Council on Foreign Relations written by Robert D.
Blackwill and Philip Zelikow about the subject in 2021, a US response, in close partnership with
our allies in the region, principally Japan, would entail sending support material such as area
denial weaponry to Taiwan with ships clearly marked as US and Japanese. This would provoke
one of two likely responses from the Chinese forces in the seas surrounding Taiwan: either they
would allow the ships to pass in order to avoid escalation, or they would end up firing on the
ships in order to avoid their supporting Taiwan.
Should this occur, Blackwill and Zelikow argue, the US and its allies would almost
certainly enter into a war with China. They argue that all efforts should be made to keep the war
very limited in scope and prevent escalation that would be disastrous for all involved parties. The
backlash against China in the international community would be intense and would lead to
severe economic pain in short order.
It should be made extremely clear that the goal of this plan is to not have to utilize it.
Instead, such a plan should be devised loudly so that both China and regional allies alike are
keenly aware of what it would entail. This is critical to the strategy behind such planning. By
making clear the ramifications of Chinese aggression toward Taiwan, the US and its allies can
help prevent China from taking such actions. It would show that the cost is simply not worth the
benefit for the state. This would both help keep the status quo on Taiwan while also reducing the
likelihood that the issue becomes a flashpoint that leads to more generalized conflict.
Mitigating Risks from the Belt and Road Initiative
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As discussed previously, China is engaging in predatory practices in its investment
strategies with other nations, including predatory lending with the Belt and Road Initiative, in
order to gain leverage over developing nations. By doing so, China is able to gain access to more
favorable trade deals, to new ports, and to more maritime power in the East Asian region, as well
as further afield. It is also able to suppress criticism of China even within the local polity of
nations in debt to it, as has been shown by Greece when it prevented the European Union (EU)
from condemning China’s actions on human rights, likely due at least in part to the deep
economic ties Greece has to China (Lee, 2018).
There are ways for the United States to work with allies and developing nations around
the world to mitigate the risks associated with increasing Chinese economic power and the BRI.
One way the US could help minimize the fallout from the BRI and the high debt it often entails
for developing nations would be to use international economic controls to extend the amount of
time that countries have to pay back their debts (Lipsky & Mark, 2020). Additionally, the US can
lead a push for China to be more transparent with its lending practices, bringing it more in-line
with the other major creditors in the international community. This would help lending be fairer,
and help untenable debts be restructured in such a way that allows for easier payment and
therefore less Chinese leverage over debtor nations.
The United States can also undercut the ability of China to further spread the BRI by
increasing the competitiveness of US investment abroad (Lew et al., 2021). This can be
accomplished by both increasing the ability and incentives for US firms and companies to invest
abroad, as well as talking up the relative benefits of working with US companies instead of the
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Belt and Road Initiative. Additionally, helping developing nations gain the specialized
knowledge they need to determine the worth of potential infrastructure ventures can help reduce
the likelihood that a state takes on a bad investment and is saddled with unrepayable debt (Lew
et al., 2021).
Finally, the US should work to strengthen existing international financial institutions such
as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to provide a transparent, safe alternative to
BRI investments for countries across the world. Ensuring that institutions such as the IMF or the
World Bank are able to offer transparent, low-risk, competitive loans capitalizes on the strengths
of the US-led international economic system and helps ensure that more countries do not tacitly
increase the power of the Chinese state by buying into the BRI (Lew et al, 2021). Undercutting
the predatory aspects of the BRI and increasing the competitiveness of other systems of
international infrastructure investment increases the resiliency and economic strength of
developing nations while ensuring that China does not gain further power in the international
community at the expense of both the US and its allies, and BRI recipient nations.
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